Fungible Convictions

Saving face in international relations has been a stereotype of Asian, especially Japanese, diplomacy, but it’s clear tonight after this New York Times report on covert operations against Iran that saving face has profound implications for avoiding war:

The interviews also indicate that Mr. Bush was convinced by top administration officials, led by Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, that any overt attack on Iran would probably prove ineffective, lead to the expulsion of international inspectors and drive Iran’s nuclear effort further out of view. Mr. Bush and his aides also discussed the possibility that an airstrike could ignite a broad Middle East war in which America’s 140,000 troops in Iraq would inevitably become involved.

Instead, Mr. Bush embraced more intensive covert operations actions aimed at Iran, the interviews show, having concluded that the sanctions imposed by the United States and its allies were failing to slow the uranium enrichment efforts. Those covert operations, and the question of whether Israel will settle for something less than a conventional attack on Iran, pose immediate and wrenching decisions for Mr. Obama.

What this says is, a visible, overt attack will ignite a multi-country full-scale war, but an invisible, covert attack will result in no overt reprisal. Specifically, for Israel with American help to eliminate the Iranian reactor at Natanz with a tactical raid or aerial bombardment, that would cause a region-wide war, inevitably involving the 140,000 American troops in Iraq. But to achieve the exact same result—the elimination of the Natanz reactor—through espionage, no overt retaliation could occur without Iran admitting that its security isn’t up to snuff.

The latter sounds much better.

It makes me thankful that we have people willing to do just that, at least given legitimate ends and a strong chain of command.